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How (not) to lose a decade 
 
Abstract 
Recovery from the Great Recession has been fraught with problems. The recovery has not 
been behaving like the aftermath of a typical cyclical recession, and this is because we are 
instead in the midst of an ongoing debt crisis. Debt crises are different, both economically and 
politically. Politically, debt crises lead to conflict over how the burden of adjustment will be 
distributed. And this conflict can seriously delay measures to alleviate the impact of the crisis 
– making everyone involved worse off. Theory and history suggest a variety of factors that 
make this sort of counter-productive conflict and delay more likely; and they also suggest 
possible ways to reduce both the conflict and the social cost of its consequences. 
 
 The world has known a long and dismal array of lost decades, in which societies 
have stagnated economically, and often politically and socially as well. The sad 
catalogue goes back at least 200 years, and we are now adding to it. The decade past has 
already been lost to the advanced industrial world: whatever economic advances were 
realized between 2002 and 2007 were wiped out by the Great Recession that began at 
the end of 2007 and whose effects are still with us. Now we stand poised to  lose 
another decade, as economic stagnation and political polarization have paralyzed the 
United States and Europe. In this context, it is worth asking what theory and history 
have to teach us about the causes of lost decades past – and how we can avoid joining 
them in the future. 
 We fear for the current decade because recovery from the Great Recession has  
been fraught with problems. The recession was, to be sure, both the longest and deepest  
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economic decline since the 1930s, but that is not all. Europe has fallen into its second 
recession in five years, and there are few signs that real economic growth will resume  
soon. The American economy is growing again, but it has taken an inordinately long 
time to get back to pre-recession levels, and employment is lagging  years behind what 
we are used to see in the wake of typical American recessions . Whether in Europe or 
the United States, this does not feel like the aftermath of a typical cyclical downturn.  
 It does not feel like the aftermath of a typical cyclical recession, because it is not: 
we are instead in the midst of an ongoing debt crisis. Debt crises are familiar, both from 
the experience of such developing and transitional economies as Turkey, Brazil, 
Thailand, and Mexico, and of centuries of such crises – including in the United States. 
And we know that debt crises are different. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff have 
shown with stunning statistical clarity how, over the course of eight centuries, debt 
crises have differed economically from “normal” recessions.1 Debt crises are also 
different politically. 
A global debt crisis 
 The crucial economic features of a debt crisis are on display on both sides of the 
Atlantic. An economy recovering from such a crisis is saddled with a mass of 
accumulated debts, which retard recovery. This “debt overhang” affects both creditors 
and debtors. On the creditor side, American and European banks hold trillions of 
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dollars in debts, many of which they know to  be bad, others of which they fear may be 
bad. In these circumstances, financial institutions are primarily concerned to shore up 
their balance sheets – to “deleverage” by shedding bad and questionable assets. They 
are very wary of making new loans, especially to marginal borrowers. This reticence to 
lend hinders a normal recovery, and  both the Federal Reserve and the European 
Central Bank have expressed their frustration at the slow pace at which new lending 
has proceeded. 
 The debt overhang exerts a similar drag on debtors. Indebted households have 
experienced a series of shocks: to their income and perhaps their employment, and to 
the value of their assets including their homes. All this reduces their disposable income, 
but their debt burdens remain. The only way households can meet their obligations, 
and rebuild their savings, is to reduce consumption.  
Banks aren’t lending, and consumers aren’t spending, and this is the principal 
explanation for the halting nature of the current recovery. There is, however, something 
of a conundrum here. Both creditors and debtors could conceivably be made better off 
by a deal that restructured debts to make them more manageable. Creditors would gain 
inasmuch as bad debts would be made better – after all, a little of something is better 
than all of nothing – so as to allow them to rebuild their portfolios. Debtors would gain 
by stringing out, or reducing, debt service payments so as to impose less of a drain on 
current consumption. This is why we have bankruptcy courts and similar proceedings. 
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Neither the creditors of a company in trouble, nor the principals of the company, gain if 
the company is driven out of business; both sides are better off if the company can be 
rebuilt as a going concern. So why have creditors and debtors in this debt crisis – as in 
many before it – found it so difficult to reach a mutually beneficial arrangement to 
restructure debts and resolve the problems created by the debt overhang? 
The answer is that debt crises are inherently political. Every debt crisis leads to 
bitter political conflict, for simple reasons. Economists characterize the starting point as 
“the asymmetry of the adjustment burden.” That is, in a debt crisis (as in a balance of 
payments crisis) the debtor has no choice but to adjust its finances if it wants to 
continue to service its debt: it has to generate the resources to pay off creditors. This 
stress is magnified if, as has happened to many sovereign and household debtors in the 
current crisis, one result is that they are cut off from continued access to credit. Debtors 
cannot continue to borrow, and have to service their debts.  Creditors, on the other 
hand, are under no such pressure. They do not have to lend out more money, which 
they can park in such riskless assets as the government securities of major financial 
centers, or in cash. This makes the burden of dealing with the crisis disproportionate 
(“asymmetric”), for debtors have to adjust while creditors do not. 
However, this economic asymmetry is just the starting point. It is true that 
creditors, in this sense, hold the whip hand: they can sit back and wait for debtors to 
repay them. But debtors have political tools in their arsenals. Debtors can counteract the 
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economic asymmetry of the adjustment burden with their own political action, in 
particular by refusing to pay. And, especially in the case of sovereign debtors, this is a 
powerful weapon, as a sovereign default could threaten the solvency of major financial 
institutions, or even the stability of creditor-country financial markets. 
The economic asymmetry of the adjustment burden, in other words, creates a 
political backlash. Keynes is said to have observed, “If I owe my bank manager a 
thousand pounds, I am at his mercy; if I owe him a million pounds, he is at my mercy,” 
and the logic here is similar.  
Debt crisis politics 
Debt crises, then, invariably turn into political battles over who will make  the 
sacrifices demanded by the accumulated debts. These battles are typically fought on 
two dimensions, international and domestic. Internationally, creditor countries square 
off against debtor countries: creditors want to be paid as much as possible, while 
debtors want to reduce their obligations by as much as they can. This drama is currently 
being played out in Europe, as it has been played out in countless sovereign debt crises 
in the past. In the American case, there is less evident international discord over the 
country’s debt to foreigners, although we have seen some early indications of a 
politicization of the country’s foreign debt.  
The second dimension of conflict over the distribution of the adjustment burden 
is domestic. Who, within a nation, will be asked to pay the principal price for dealing 
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with the implications of the crisis? This is true even in the case of creditor countries – in 
Germany today, there are questions about whether the losses realized from foreign 
debts gone bad should be made up by the financial sector, by taxpayers, or by others. In 
debtor countries, such as those on the European periphery, the issue has been the 
centerpiece of political strife for several years: in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, will it 
be government employees, taxpayers, beneficiaries of government programs, or others 
to bear the burden of dealing with the nation’s obligations? 
 We have a great deal of experience with this sort of backlash. In the interwar 
period, foreign debts – including the closely related war debts and German reparations 
– were central to international and domestic political conflict from the moment the crisis 
began in 1929. In fact, every country that was a net foreign debtor as of 1929 moved 
dramatically toward some form of authoritarianism afterwards – Nazism, reactionary 
military rule, extreme economic nationalism, or militarism. No net creditor country did 
so. And it is easy to understand why: for the debtors, the enemies were foreigners, 
bankers, international markets, perhaps markets in general. The result was a massive 
backlash against the open world economy that had prevailed before 1914, and briefly in 
the 1920s, and that was regarded by debtors in crisis as the source of their distress. 
 The political aftermath of the Latin American debt crisis that began in the early 
1980s was more positive, as most of the region’s countries democratized. This was 
probably because the governments in power when the region collapsed were largely 
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authoritarian, so that military dictatorships took the blame (rightly) for the crisis. But 
crisis-borne conflicts over economic policy beset the region for most of the decade, and 
made progress difficult. And in some Latin American countries with democratic 
systems, the debt crisis led to serious political disruptions. Venezuela is probably the 
best example, for the country’s long-standing democratic party system effectively 
collapsed because it could not find its way out of the crisis. 
 Today, the Eurozone finds itself mired in just this sort of political conflict, both 
among nations and within them. It is unlikely to lead to the sort of dire outcomes we 
saw in the 1930s, but the crisis has threatened the political stability of a number of 
European debtor nations. 
In the United States, the conflict is somewhat more muted. This is in part because, 
unlike the European debtors, the United States has not faced a “sudden stop,” in which 
foreign lenders abruptly decide they will not lend, or will lend only at prohibitive 
interest rates. It is also in part because so  much of the American debt problem is one of 
households, not governments, and so the battle lines are not so clear. Nonetheless, there 
are plenty of indications of fundamental political conflicts over economic policy, from 
the bitter campaign against the Obama administration’s fiscal stimulus to vitriolic 
attacks on the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy. These largely reflect the divergent 
interests at play. Taxpayers less hard hit by the crisis see no reason to accumulate 
further obligations in order to assist those who were most affected. Savers (especially 
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among elderly retirees) view today’s extremely low interest rates primarily as a blow to 
their ability to live on their savings, undertaken for a vague promise of growth in 
output and employment which is largely irrelevant to them.  
 In many, perhaps most, cases, these crisis-driven political battles turn into a sort 
of game of Chicken. Creditors threaten to cut debtors off from further funds, and to 
punish them; debtors threaten to withhold payment; and the first side to flinch loses. 
This war of attrition can drag on for years, delaying an ultimate settlement. In the case 
of Latin America, domestic and international clashes continued for seven years until 
finally, in 1989, the Brady Plan oversaw a comprehensive restructuring of sovereign  
debts that eventually allowed an exit from the region’s lost decade. In Japan after 1990, 
the unwillingness or inability of the government to confront the effects of the 
insolvency of some of the country’s leading banks and corporations, and continued 
skirmishes over who would pay to keep the merry-go-round moving, prolonged the 
country’s own lost decade until at least 2003. Today, as Menzie Chinn and I wrote in 
our Lost Decades: The Making of America’s Debt Crisis and the Long Recovery: 
Financial interests resist regulations that shift the burden of risky behavior 
back onto them and off of the taxpayer. Beneficiaries of government programs 
fight against attempts to curb their benefits. Taxpayers refuse to pay the taxes 
needed to pay for the programs they want. Partisan politicians block reasoned 
discussion, suggesting absurd pseudo-solutions instead of realistic alternatives. 
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Ideologues and political opportunists encourage Americans to cling to the 
childish things that have served us so poorly in the past…. 
In all these cases and more, delay is especially worrisome, as it raises the final cost of 
the settlement itself – not only economically but socially and politically. 
Declaring a war of attrition 
 Political polarization can paralyze attempts to resolve a debt crisis, driving the 
principals into a costly and lengthy war of attrition. Each side launches threats and 
ultimatums, stakes out intransigent positions, tries to force the hand of protagonists – 
and meanwhile the crisis worsens as the parties become even more extreme and 
resolution even more difficult. What does experience tell us about what makes such a 
war of attrition more likely – and, more positively, how we might avoid a descent into 
this downward spiral? Let us start with understanding the reasons that the worst-case 
scenarios are so often played out. 
 None of the participants in a war of attrition, or a game of Chicken, has an 
interest in making the ultimate settlement more costly; but all of them want to shunt as 
much of the cost onto others as possible. The war goes on to the extent that the desire to 
come out ahead dominates the urge to compromise. What then might heighten the 
sense that winning is imperative, and weaken the feeling that compromise is desirable? 
Theory and experience point to four factors.2 
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 The stakes. Higher stakes in contention give each side stronger reasons to fight to 
the finish, in order to avoid massive losses, or to realize massive gains. James Madison 
realized this, and in one of the more famous passages in the Federalist Papers argued that 
the way to mitigate crippling factional strife was to lower the stakes, and thus make it 
impossible for any faction to lose everything (or win everything).3 In financial crises, 
both debtors and creditors have good reasons to fear being made destitute if they lose – 
the former because they will have to spend decades shouldering an impossible debt 
burden, the latter because they will lose a valuable asset and even risk insolvency. In 
some historical debt crises, indeed, the stakes were even higher: a losing debtor could 
lose its sovereignty. In the 1930s, those who lost the financial conflict faced dire 
economic results, and even physical danger, as when authoritarian nationalist regimes 
turned upon both foreign and domestic creditor classes. The higher the stakes, the 
greater the incentive to fight to the bitter end. 
 Uncertainty. Even if all groups in a crisis-ridden society were sure that the 
ultimate effects of a settlement would be positive, they could not be sure that they 
would end up on the winning side of the ledger that, of necessity, will include some 
losers. One party’s insecurities about the implications of a settlement  give it reasons to 
delay, whether to seek greater assurances or to cut a more favorable deal. The greater 
the uncertainty there is about the precise distribution of costs and benefits in an 
eventual crisis resolution, the stronger is the desire to delay agreement. 
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 Lack of credibility. Most arrangements to resolve financial crises require that both 
sides make assurances about future behavior: debtors agree to service their debts, 
creditors promise to reopen lines of credit. But both sides have strong reasons to agree 
to comply in order to get a better deal, only to then go back on their words. This is not 
necessarily due to dishonesty, but by the complex forces jockeying for position on both 
sides. Creditor countries and institutions may disagree among themselves, while debtor 
nations are riven by factional conflict, and this can make commitments made in good 
faith impossible to keep a month, or a year, later. Knowing how tenuous are such 
promises, neither side may be willing to make valuable concessions. This was a central 
problem in the 1930s. In 1931, as the major Austrian Creditanstalt bank lurched toward 
a bankruptcy that everyone recognized would create serious Europe-wide problems, 
the European powers arrived at a joint rescue plan. However, this plan broke down in 
the days before the bank failed because the German and French sides did not trust each 
other to follow through on their promises. Where a settlement involves a promise of 
future compensation in return for compromise, the lack of credibility of such 
compensation is a grave impediment to compromise itself. 
 Lack of solidarity. Society as a whole bears a terrible cost for delaying a resolution 
to crisis. Yet “society” is a nebulous concept, and this cost may not be felt by all. 
Countries that are riven by ethnic, political, or other divisions will find it much harder 
to agree to make the sacrifices necessary in the present to preserve the future. Germans 
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were willing to pay a stiff price for German unification; they are not willing to pay 
anything like as high a price for European unity. 
 All of these factors help explain the grave difficulties that countries have faced in 
resolving serious debt crises, and why Reinhart and Rogoff estimate that such crises 
take anywhere from five to ten years to resolve. The very high stakes involved, the 
grave uncertainties about the impact of a settlement, the difficulties in crafting 
agreements that are credible, and the absence of a sense of solidarity among the parties 
– all these stand in the way of a resolution that would, in the end, be in the general 
interest. 
 Lost decades, then, are the result of the political inability of debtors and creditors 
to arrive at a compromise that is in both sides’ interest – at a Pareto improvement. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, in one way or the other, we appear to be at or near this 
predicament. So what does the experience of such wars of attrition past suggest of a 
positive nature? That is, what might we suggest that could smooth the path toward a 
happier outcome going forward? 
Avoiding another lost decade 
 We can escape another lost decade, but it will not be easy. One reason, apart 
from all those mentioned, is that the global nature of the crisis means that a resolution 
will require international cooperation – and international cooperation is never simple. 
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Nonetheless, most of the problems our societies face will be difficult, even impossible – 
or at least very costly – to resolve by single national governments alone. 
 In this context, it is worthy of note that there is an impressive recent record of 
recent international cooperation, specifically on monetary policy.  Almost as soon as the 
crisis broke, the world’s major central banks began working together to limit the 
damage. The results have been encouraging, and surprising to many who felt that 
macroeconomic policy coordination was neither likely nor advisable. One can 
understand monetary policymakers taking a well-deserved rest on their laurels. 
 However, experience and common sense make clear that monetary policy 
cooperation is necessary, but not sufficient, to avoid a further descent. The interwar 
period, again, tells cautionary tales. From the vantage point of 1928, in fact, self-
congratulations might have seemed in order. Starting in 1920, central bankers and other 
economic policymakers had engaged in an unprecedented range of cooperative 
ventures: conferences, treaties, the creation of international organizations.  Central 
bankers, the League of Nations Economic and Financial Committee, and private 
bankers had overseen a challenging series of stabilization programs in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and in Latin America. Virtually every major economy was back on the 
gold standard. And yet the entire architecture of collaboration collapsed within a couple 
of years of the onset of the crisis. As it turned out, central bank cooperation could not 
overcome the broader and deeper political disagreements that erupted over the morass 
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of sovereign and private debts that weighed down on the world economy after 1929. So 
cooperation that goes beyond the purely monetary is necessary; but of what sort, and to 
what end? 
 One could hope for international cooperation to avoid debt crises in the first 
place. This desire is reflected by ongoing discussions of the desirability of international 
macroeconomic cooperation, especially with respect to global imbalances. The 
sentiment underlying this trend is laudable, and is likely to develop further in coming 
years.4 Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that debt crises can definitively be prevented: 
we do not fully understand why they recur, and even if we did, avoiding them might 
involve undesirable limits on cross-border lending. So long as international lending 
persists, foreign debt crises will recur. 
 How, then, can we work to facilitate the resolution of those debt crises that do 
develop? We can start by addressing the factors that contribute to the eruption and 
prolongation of the wars of attrition in which so  many debt crises have become mired. 
And so we revisit the four factors discussed above, but in reverse. 
 Stakes. Inasmuch as higher stakes feed intransigence, so can  compromise be 
facilitated by making clear that all-or-nothing outcomes are off the table. If the parties 
are confident that the costs (and benefits) of a settlement will be relatively equally 
distributed, they have stronger reasons to arrive at a settlement. One way to diminish 
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the stakes – common in most debt-ridden societies – is to allow a bit of inflation to 
reduce the real debt burden.5 
 Uncertainty. As insecurity about the results of a resolution leads to delay, greater 
information about its impact can make it easier to negotiate. Where both sides know 
what the results of possible settlements will be – and what the effect of not settling will 
be – they have less reason to stall in favor of a more certain outcome. This implies, 
contrary to much current thinking, that open and direct discussion of the terms of a 
debt restructuring is likely to lead to a more rapid resolution than one that is kept secret, 
and that keeps the public on both sides guessing. 
 Credibility. The eventual agreement will certainly require commitments about 
future behavior on all sides. Where these commitments can be believed, they will be 
more likely to be accepted. Third parties are a traditional way of trying to provide some 
modest assurance that promises will be kept. 
  Solidarity. It may be foolhardy to think that a sense of social solidarity can be 
created. However, some political institutions and arrangements are more encompassing 
than others, and lead policymakers – and perhaps the public – to think beyond narrow 
interests. Governments of national unity, for example, can cut across partisan and other 
divisions to allow consideration of the broader society-wide effects of the successful 
resolution of a crisis. So too can broad coalitions that include otherwise conflicting sides 
of the battlefield. 
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 Many of these approaches have emerged over time in attempts to resolve debt 
crises. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, joint private-public creditor 
committees were the principal locus of negotiation. In the interwar period, the League 
of Nations Economic and Financial Committee came to play a major role. Since the 
1970s, most debt-crisis management has been overseen by the International Monetary 
Fund. These auspices have helped, in the ways indicated, make agreements easier – 
with varying degrees of success. They can make available accurate information about 
the implications of a settlement, as well as provide a third party to help make any 
promises more credible. All this can allow the opposing sides to ratchet down their 
demands and come to a more rapid, more equitable resolution. 
 Perhaps the most striking example of what can go wrong, and right, in these 
circumstances comes from comparing the policies of the United States in the aftermath 
of World Wars One and Two. In the 1920s and early 1930s, the United States took an 
intransigent position on war debts, and by extension reparations – as Calvin Coolidge 
said, “They hired the money, didn’t they?” The Americans, with Congress dominated 
by isolationists who wanted little to do with European entanglements, adamantly 
refused to consider renegotiating debts until it was much too late. The Allies generally 
kept the financial burden placed on Germany as reparations payments very ambiguous, 
so much so that even today there is uncertainty as to how large they were expected to 
be. Some of the major creditors made extreme demands on the debtors, and showed no 
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willingness to provide relief as needed. And the highly polarized political situation in 
both debtors and creditors meant that any commitments made were likely to be 
violated by a successor government. All this was, as we know, a formula for stalemate, 
and eventually disaster. 
 After World War Two, the United States took a very different path – perhaps 
because it had learned lessons, perhaps because American politics had evolved. The 
United States largely forgave war debts and forwent reparations. It oversaw a remaking 
of entire political systems to lower the stakes of political conflict, encouraging an 
encompassing centrist consensus around Western Europe. The U. S. government, 
especially in the context of the Marshall Plan, acted as intermediary among  previously 
warring nations to provide clear commitments of future behavior. All this made it far 
easier to work out the economic adjustments necessary to rebuild Western Europe. 
 More recent experiences incorporate similar lessons. IMF programs typically 
insist on some sharing of burdens between debtors and creditors, the Fund’s 
involvement enhances the credibility of commitments on both sides, and the IMF’s 
economic analysis and information help define the likely implications of agreements 
made. Often, the involvement of foreign governments provides similar anchors to 
speed a settlement. And as negotiations proceed, it is important to point out that 
creditors can often make things better for themselves by compromising than by 
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remaining intransigent. An earlier, comprehensive, credible settlement is better than a 
delayed, fragmented one that can easily be evaded or disavowed. 
 To be sure, there are no magic potions to speed the resolution of a debt crisis. The 
interests in play are too significant, and the potential costs too high, to be readily 
amenable to some easy answer. Nonetheless, theory and history provide some 
suggestions about tactics to pursue. 
The path ahead 
 What is certain is that we face grave problems as we attempt to resolve our 
ongoing debt crises. It is easy to identify the obstacles; it is not easy to identify 
politically feasible ways forward. But we do need to find some way to lessen the 
intransigence, lower the rhetoric, improve the information available, provide credible 
commitments to the protagonists – and to have all involved take into account the 
broader costs of inflexibility and delay. 
 All debt crises are extremely difficult, and many of them have led to a lost 
decade, or two. We are certainly at serious risk of repeating this experience. As we 
wrote in Lost Decades: 
A skeptic might conclude that nothing can change for the better, that 
neither the interest groups nor the taxpayers nor the policymakers have any 
reason to act differently. We prefer to think that there are times when citizens, 
voters, interest groups, and policymakers are able to rise above their own self-
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interested concerns. We hope that now is one of those times; and that we learn 
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